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DIFFICULTIES IN UNDERSTANDING THE AUTONOMY OF 
SCIENCE: CONSEQUENCES OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
 
Within his article Science and Trans-science (1972), Alvin Weinberg 
outlines his conception of trans-science as being a natural consequence 
of problems arising from the interaction between science, technology, 
and society. The solutions to the problems “hang on the answers to 
questions which can be asked of science and yet cannot be answered by 
science.” (Weinberg 1972, 209) These trans-scientific questions take 
various forms. One set of questions is related to matters to which 
science cannot feasibly obtain an answer. One such a question would 
be: “What is the long-term effect of low-level radiation on biological 
organisms?” In principle this experiment could be conducted. Weinberg 
states, that if we wanted to have a 95% confidence level in its results, 
the experiment would require 8,000,000,000 mice. While such an 
experiment could be theoretically conducted, it remains unfeasible 
given society’s limited resources.  (Weinberg 1972, 210) The second set 
of trans-scientific questions is a situation where the subject matter is ill 
captured by science. Weinberg gives sociology as an example of this. 
The main reason for this is that, while in physics individual atoms can 
be described by general laws of physics and are homogeneous with one 
another, individual persons acting in society are more chaotic and are 
heterogeneous from one another, making generalizations less useful 
and less scientific. (Weinberg 1972, 212) The third set of trans-
scientific questions is axiological in nature and asks “why” rather than 
“what”, establishing the methodology of and priorities within science. 
These sorts of questions are matters of “scientific taste” rather than 
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questions of science. It is this set of axiological questions that we are 
interested in for the purposes of this paper.  
 
The answers to these questions, while bearing upon the practice of 
science, do not belong to any specific scientific discipline. (Weinberg 
1972, 213) For example, we can ask a question of priority “What data is 
relevant to this experiment?” A second question we can ask is, “Is this 
sort of research good for society?” A third question can be, “How do we 
promote scientific research?” Fourthly we can ask, “Should scientists 
prefer paradigm shifting theories or theories that support our current 
paradigm?” These sorts of questions highlight four main categories of 
values: 1) science’s inner value, 2) the value of science, 3) values for 
science, and 4) values brought into science. The inner values of science 
include truth (viz. what is true or what counts as a fact) and 
justification (i.e. what degree of error is acceptable). The “value of 
science” includes what is the good of science for society, and general 
questions about science’s instrumental value. The values for science are 
those values that serve science itself. These would include the 
allocation of grants, patent protection laws, and the establishment of 
research institutions.  Finally, values brought into science include 
matters of how to prioritize research (namely, should we invest in the 
development of a blue rose or a cure for AIDS) and taste in scientific 
procedure (from emphasizing research that advances scientific 
knowledge to the Soviet policy of Lysenkoism). All of these values need 
to be determined for the well functioning of science and how they are 
determined affects scientific autonomy.   
 
One approach to resolving these axiological questions is to leave it to 
the scientist to sort out. This would be in the lines of a model that uses a 
strict autonomy of science, or linear model, that is advocated for by 
Vannevar Bush in his report to the President of the United States 
Science the Endless Frontier (1945). Such a model suggests that society 
should provide science with the support needed to independently 
pursue various self-policed lines of research.  This research will then 
build up our well of basic research that will in turn result in both social 
and economic benefits for society. (Briggle and Mitcham 2012, 217)  
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Carl Mitcham and Adam Briggles, however, note that difficulties arise 
when trying to resolve these axiological questions with idea of strict 
autonomy for science. They question the direct connection between 
good science (that is to say epistemologically sound science) and 
science that is good for society. Mitcham and Briggles present three 
sorts of science, while still being good science, that are questionably 
good for society. One example would be spending society’s limited 
resources on trivial knowledge like a cure for balding. Secondly, there is 
dangerous knowledge like learning how to create a weapon out of a 
deadly virus or how to create an atomic bomb. Thirdly there is 
controversial knowledge that poses moral dilemmas like the use of data 
from NAZI human experimentation or more contemporaneously 
embryonic stem cell research. (Briggle and Mitcham 2012, 217)  
 
Looking specifically at the issue of embryonic stem cell research, they 
note that there “is no bright line between science and its many social 
contexts.” (Briggle and Mitcham 2012, 212) Science does not operate 
outside of the confines of society and the value of embryonic stem cell 
research is not solely a scientific question. While science can determine 
if embryonic stem cells can be used in this or that fashion, there are 
other questions that it cannot answer. There are moral / religious 
proponents and opponents to the use of embryonic stem cells. There 
are questions of how to finance this research and subsequent 
marketability of products derived from this research. Furthermore, 
there are political questions on whether to promote or prohibit this 
sort research.   Society has an interest in both the values inserted into 
embryonic stem cell research and the far-reaching results of it. Drawing 
upon Weinberg’s concept of “Big Science” captures this interest. This 
big science is the sort of science that needs big money, big staff, big 
equipment, has a big impact on society, 1 and need the direction, 
support, and subsequent control by socio-political institutions. (Briggle 
and Mitcham 2012, 218)  
                                                        
1 Notably such “Big Science” projects would include the Manhattan Project, The Apollo 
Space Program, The Large Hadron Collider, or the International Space Station.    
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Given this sort of interest we are then led to consider the nature of this 
connection between science and society. David Guston, in his article 
Forget Politicizing Science. Let’s Democratize it!, acknowledges that 
science has been deeply politicized and rather than confronting it we 
should ensure that science becomes more democratic. He is quick to 
note that by democratic he does not “mean settling matters of Nature 
by plebiscite.” (Guston 2004, 25)  Rather, he argues that the 
determination of the axiological values of science should be open to 
democratic principles of accessibility, transparency, and accountability. 
Furthermore, science should be participatory, relevant, and popular in 
addition to maintaining its epistemic rigor. (Guston 2004, 25 -26) 
Weinberg agrees with this assessment noting that in “issues that effect 
everyone, and not just the scientists, and therefore everyone, has a right 
to be heard.” (Weinberg 1972, 218) In matters of both public and 
science policy, the role of experts is instrumental to forming good 
policies, but this should not come at the cost of ignoring non-experts 
who are nonetheless affected by these policies. This acknowledgement 
of people, who have various degrees of scientific knowledge, in the 
formation of policies, is a natural consequence of systems of 
governance that rely upon popular sovereignty for their legitimacy.  
 
Such consequences bring us to our final point. Provided that the 
axiology of science is determined by society at large, and not by 
scientists themselves, we should examine how this determination is 
expressed. This presupposes that we are working within a framework 
of society that operates with democratic principles resting upon 
popular sovereignty. Genevieve Nootens, in her book Popular 
Sovereignty in the West: Polities Contentions and Ideas, provides 
description of popular sovereignty as a system that rests:  
on the idea that the people rule (and ought to rule) and legislate for 
themselves, although indirectly. It is indirect in two ways: one the 
people are represented as forming one national community; and 
they rule through their representatives. The ways representation in 
the legislative body relates to the representation as one national 
community varies, though. In other words, in the West, the idea of 
popular sovereignty came to be closely identified with democratic 
Michael P. Musielewicz 
Difficulties in Understanding the Autonomy of Science: Consequences of State 
Sovereignty 
[124] 
self-rule, namely, the normative requirement according to which 
law is legitimate insofar as it is the product of the people’s decision-
making. (Nootens 2013, 73 - 74) 
 
Nootens’ definition I take to be a fair representation of the current state 
of affairs of popular sovereignty, and of the West in general. If we take 
this notion of sovereignty seriously, we see that the people participate 
in (and legitimize) the formation of science policy through their 
representative operating in the locus of the state. 
 
With this understanding, the state in turn may make science policy 
decisions that can determine the values within the axiology of science, 
as an expression of the self-rule of the nation expressed by democratic 
means. Additionally, this expression maintains its legitimacy in 
directing science, provided that it is acting in accordance with the 
collective will. Here we can see that the autonomy of science, in the 
strong sense of being able to determine its own axiology, no longer 
functions. For science, while valuable, has become a subgroup within 
society (and the state) and not a distinct part or appendage. Moreover, 
science, as a subgroup, is subject to the collective “democratic self-rule” 
of the society within which it is operating, or in short the state’s science 
policy. Moreover, this policy sits on the shelf of other policies adopted 
by the state, viz. its energy policy, education policy, defense policy etc. It 
is important to note that a semblance of autonomy may exist, but it is 
circumscribed in an expanding or contracting grant given by society 
through the state.     
 
In conclusion, we have seen that the old model for the function of 
science, namely the idea of the strong autonomy of science cannot 
function within the state. This stems from problems in the 
understanding of the autonomy of science within the context of 
sovereignty, and society. If we have a state the makes claims of the self-
rule of the collective and all its subsidiary parts, then science, as a part, 
must too be regulated by such a state. Further considerations on this 
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topic include a flushing out of the link between our conception of state 
sovereignty and its influence upon the axiology of science.  
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ABSTRACT 
The importance of the autonomy of science is generally assumed to be 
good for the proper functioning of science. Yet, when we examine the 
notion more closely, various difficulties present themselves and cloud 
our understanding of this important concept. One such complication 
presents itself when we examine the relationship between science and 
the state. When examining the relationship between science and the 
state, there is an area of overlap that is called by Alvin Weinberg as 
trans-science. This concept contains within it an axiology of science that 
has bearing upon the scientific process itself. This leads us to ask, who 
determines the values in this axiology of science? In this paper I will 
argue that the state takes precedence in determining these values in the 
axiology of science which impacts science’s autonomy.  To do this, I will 
first present an outline of what the concept of trans-science is. Next I 
will present the axiology of science and ways of determining it. Finally I 
will present the State’s role in determining these values.  
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